Professor Nagle gently suggests that election law itself may not be a coherent field of study, noting that much election law jurisprudence appears to turn on matters of appearance over that of substance. 4 Professor Fuentes-Rohwer agrees with much of my analysis, but argues that I do not go far enough-suggesting that the logical end-point of my argument is for the Supreme Court to extricate itself from the political thicket entirely. 5 Professor Charles argues that my distinction between core and contested equality rights eliminates any purpose for judicial review and is too difficult to put into practice. 6 In this Reply, I defend my approach. Professor Nagle is correct that the Court often strays from the right path when it decides election law cases on appearances alone, but he fails to recognize how conceiving of election law synthetically informs Court decision-making on issues such as the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims. Professor Fuentes-Rohwer's general suggestion that the Court exit from the political thicket has much to commend it in the abstract, but he fails to evaluate my proposal as a "second best" approach, particularly compared to the main alternative floating around election law circles today: the structuralist approach that focuses on "appropriate" political competition. Finally, Professor Charles puts his finger on the most difficult aspect of my book, and I welcome his decision to take my proposed distinction between core and contested equality claims seriously.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 7
The Supreme Court and Election Law examines the Supreme Court's role in regulating the U.S. political process since its 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr, 8 when the Court first held reapportionment claims justiciable. 9 Before 1962, the Supreme Court decided an average of ten election law cases per decade with a written opinion. 10 After 1962, the number of cases increased to sixty per decade, and the percentage of election law cases as a portion of the entire Supreme Court docket went up by more than sevenfold.
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Along the way, the Court has: required the reapportionment of virtually every legislative body in the country to comply with the principle of "one person, one vote"; ended the practice of political patronage employment; prevented local governments, states, and the federal government from limiting campaign spending in the name of political equality; curtailed the extent to which legislatures may take race into account in drawing district lines; and most recently (and, some would add, notoriously) determined the outcome of the 2000 presidential election. 12 The book has four central objectives: (1) to chronicle the Supreme Court's political equality cases; (2) to give the Court tools to use to decide such cases carefully; (3) to make a substantive argument for when the Court should intervene in political equality cases; and (4) to argue against structuralist interpretations of election law.
Chapter One surveys the Supreme Court's regulation of political equality since 1960 in four key areas: formal equality requirements, wealth, race, and political parties. Rather than canvass every case that arguably falls into each of these categories, the survey shows general trends. The Chapter concludes with a look at Bush v. Gore Supreme Court can learn from such variations the best way to ultimately craft new political equality rules. Chapter Three argues that the Court should play a central role in protecting the core of three equality principles: the "essential political rights" principle, the "antiplutocracy" principle, and the "collective action" principle. The three principles are limits on the government's power to treat people differently in the political process. The principles are derived primarily from social consensus (or near consensus) about the contemporary understanding of political equality, and Chapter Three defends this basis for determining the scope of political equality claims.
The "essential political rights" principle prevents the government from interfering with basic political rights and requires equal treatment of votes and voters. The "antiplutocracy" principle prevents the government from conditioning meaningful participation in the political process on wealth or money. The "collective action" principle prevents the government from impeding through unreasonable restrictions the ability of people to organize into groups for political action.
Chapter Three argues that if the government attempts to place a limit on the exercise of one of these three core political equality principles, the Court, with an eye on legislative self-interest and agency problems, must engage in a skeptical balancing of interests. This kind of balancing is very different from the deferential balancing we have seen from the Court, particularly in recent years when it has acted to protect the Democratic and Republican parties from political competition. Although the Court's role is to protect the core, the Court should not act on its own to take sides in cases involving contested equality principles. When a plaintiff raises such a claim, the Court should reject its constitutionalization.
Instead, as Chapter Four explains, it is up to Congress or state and local legislative bodies (or the people, in those jurisdictions with an initiative process) to decide whether to expand political equality principles into contested areas. The Court generally should defer to such decisions, if the Court can be confident that the legislature's intent is to foster equality rather than engage in self-dealing. Chapter Four examines whether the Court's treatment of campaign finance laws and the Voting Rights Act is consistent with this idea, arguing that the Court was wrong to reject the equality rationale for campaign finance regulation in its initial campaign finance cases. The Court appears poised to go down the wrong path in the Voting Rights Act cases as well, perhaps holding major provisions of the Act unconstitutional as exceeding Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Chapters Three and Four defend strict balancing tests as appropriate in the political equality cases. The balancing called for differs significantly from the Court's balancing tests by requiring a close connection between legislative means and ends as an indirect way to police legislative self-interest. Nonetheless, balancing represents the typical way that the Court has (at least ostensibly) handled such claims in the past.
A reader familiar with the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence might not think balancing needs much defending. To the contrary, however, we are in the midst of a disturbing trend, moving away from a focus on individual rights and toward "structural arguments" about workings of the political system. Chapter Five considers these structural arguments, which have come from both the Court in its racial gerrymandering cases such as Shaw v. Reno, 14 and from some election law scholars, calling for the Court to promote a certain kind of political competition rather than engage in what they term "sterile" balancing of individual rights and state interests. Far from being a sterile concept, equality claims, both individual and group, remain at the core of how the court should evaluate election law claims. Structural arguments, whether made by the Court or commentators, are misguided and potentially dangerous. They evince judicial hubris, a belief that judges appropriately should be cast in the role of supreme political regulators. In sum, the book argues in favor of preserving room for Supreme Court intervention in the political process, but for intervention that is (1) tentative and malleable, (2) focused on individual (or sometimes group) rights and not on the "structure" or "functioning" of the political system, (3) protective of core political equality principles, and (4) deferential to political branches' attempts to promote contested visions of political equality. 
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On this narrower point about appearances, Professor Nagle and I agree. The Supreme Court should not decide election law cases on the basis of appearance rather than reality. The proper question in a case like Shaw, which established the unconstitutional racial gerrymander claim, is the extent to which taking race into account in districting inflicts real harm: "Even when the government 'sends a message with its conduct' in a political equality case, we should view that message as irrelevant if it has no bearing on real political power relationships." 25 But on the broader question, the search for a unified theory of election law is undoubtedly necessary, for three reasons. First, in election law cases, the partisan motivations of judges and justices are commonly (if unfairly) called into question. The extent to which courts can delineate the ground rules before any controversy serves to diffuse claims of partisan bias. It does not matter whether the theory is process theory, 26 the political markets approach, 27 or my own normative approach. Some theory to constrain judges is better than none. 28 Pre-commitment to theory, like adherence to stare decisis, preserves the legitimacy of the courts as well as public confidence in the judiciary as an institution. Second, a unified theory holds out the promise of a bedrock component of the rule of law: that like cases be treated alike. In The Supreme Court and Election Law, I offer numerous examples of the Court getting caught up in doctrinal categories over maintaining consistency across similar cases. For example, I criticize the Supreme Court for having different "one person, one vote" rules for congressional districting on the one hand, and state and local districting on the other, without support in constitutional text or theory. 29 It is silly to consider the equal population principle for creating legislative districts in these two areas in isolation simply because one is decided under Article I, Section 2, 30 and the other decided under the Fourteenth Because election law cases raise common questions about the law governing the processes by which the people choose their representative and otherwise participate in political decisionmaking, it makes sense to think of diverse election law cases comparatively. That is not to say election law cases cannot benefit from consideration of constitutional law issues outside the election context-it is that treating an election law case simply as another constitutional case runs the risk of the Court mechanically applying constitutional doctrine without considering how the Court's ruling will affect political rights more broadly. 36 Consider the Vieth case again. The question before the Court was the extent to which it is impermissible for those drawing legislative district lines to take voters' party identification into account in drawing lines for partisan advantage. 37 My sense is that the emergence of courses like the ones the contributors to this symposium teach is a good thing. But in addition to teaching students how to think about problems related to the political process they may encounter as law clerks, litigators, or policymakers, the major virtue of treating the law of the political process as a coherent subject lies in enabling scholars and students to see connections among the various pieces of constitutional law and statutes that influence how our politics is conducted. It would be unfortunate for everyone concerned if legal regulation of the political process were to hive off completely from constitutional law and the two bodies were to evolve separately to the point where there is little possibility of continued cross-fertilization. Just as other aspects of constitutional law cannot be fully understood divorced from the political institutions that produce them, so too our political institutions and practices cannot be understood in a vacuum: they are a piece of constitutional law. Finally, while I agree with Professor Nagle that a unified theory requires adoption of some normative vision for election law, the decision to avoid a uniform theory raises the same normative pitfalls. To use Professor Nagle's own example, one could view campaign finance issues primarily through the lens of First Amendment free speech cases.
48 But a free speech focus creates its own normative agenda-an agenda that would lead the Court to strike down most campaign finance regulations. My point here is not to argue whether it is better for the Court to strike down or uphold campaign finance regulation, but rather to illustrate the benefits of a unified theory. I could imagine someone crafting a "libertarian" election law with a unified theme of the Court crafting election law case outcomes to maximize individual rights and liberties. This unified theory would be similarly deregulationist with respect to campaign finance as a First Amendment approach. But it would have the added benefit of allowing the Court to decide other election law cases outside the First Amendment area in a consistent manner. Rather, the Court faces a choice among: (1) a potentially more modest role for the Court in the electoral arena as I suggest; (2) the current high level of Supreme Court intervention in the electoral arena; and (3) a markedly more aggressive role as set forth by those in the structuralist, or political markets, camp of election law scholars. 56 There is, of course, no guarantee that a Court that has self-consciously and publicly committed to my "minimalist" 57 election law agenda would not inevitably slip into activism; but surely it will be harder to intervene actively than under current jurisprudence that provides little such constraint. Additionally, the structural/political markets approach is an invitation to judicial command-and-control of the political process. Contrast my minimalism with the hubristic approach of the structuralists. Professor Fuentes-Rohwer mentions the important Vieth case, and it is here that structuralists waged their strongest battle yet to move the Court away from a rights-based approach and toward a focus on assuring an appropriate level of political competition. 58 In the end, the Court-by accident, rather than by design-reached the right result.
IV. FUENTES-ROHWER AND THE SECOND-BEST THEORY OF ELECTION LAW: A COURT
Vieth was a 4-1-4 split decision. Four Justices issued a plurality opinion stating that partisan gerrymandering claims should be considered nonjusticiable because of the absence of a "judicially manageable" standard for separating permissible from impermissible consideration of party affiliation of voters in the redistricting enterprise.
59 Four Justices would have adopted one of three invigorated tests to police partisan gerrymandering. 60 Justice Kennedy, writing only for himself, cast the decisive vote on the Court. He agreed with the four dissenters that partisan gerrymandering cases remain justiciable, but he also agreed with the four Justices in the plurality that the Vieth plaintiffs' claim must fail. 61 According to Justice Kennedy, no one has yet devised an acceptable test to separate out unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering from constitutionally permissible consideration of voters' party information in redistricting.
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As I have explained at greater length elsewhere, 63 the Vieth result is perfectly defensible (though Justice Kennedy's suggestions of where to find a workable partisan gerrymandering standard are a likely dead end). 64 No social consensus existed in 1986, when the Court decided Bandemer, or exists today on the extent to which it is permissible to take voter party identification information into account in drawing district lines. Justice Kennedy's crucial fifth vote in Vieth serves that same backstop purpose as Bandemer has served: for the foreseeable future, partisan gerrymandering claims will fail. But Justice Kennedy's vote allows the courts to reconsider the question periodically as circumstances and perhaps, attitudes, change. Professor Fuentes-Rohwer incorrectly suggests that a social consensus against partisan gerrymandering exists, at least when measured through elite opinion. 65 This elite opinion criticizes "partisan gerrymandering" in the abstract-as did the Vieth plurality, it is worth noting 66 -and, so far as I can tell, it offers no meaningful standard 58. See generally Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, supra note 56 (advocating aggressive judicial intervention to prevent gerrymandering).
59. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1792 (plurality). 60. See id. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1815 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 1822, 1828 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1794-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 62. See id. at 1796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Because, in the case before us, we have no standard by which to measure the burden appellants claim has been imposed on their representational rights, appellants cannot establish that the alleged political classifications burden those same rights.").
63. See generally Hasen, supra note 41. 64. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1793. 65. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 1, at 32 ("Could it really be said that a social consensus against the gerrymander does not exist? One would be hard-pressed to find a newspaper editorial in support of the egregious gerrymanders of recent years, as seen in Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Texas, to name a few.").
66. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1785 (plurality).
for separating permissible from impermissible consideration of voter identification information in districting. Moreover, the issue does not appear to be on the public's radar screen. If, indeed, there is such social consensus against partisan gerrymandering, why do we not see more attempts in the twenty-four states with the initiative process to put limitations on partisan gerrymandering, such as a requirement of non-partisan redistricting commissions? But the structuralists would not stop at intervention by the Court to end partisan gerrymandering. Indeed, a great debate among structuralists today concerns the best way for the Court to use the Constitution to prohibit the practice of bipartisan gerrymandering. The discussion of bipartisan gerrymandering takes for encouragement some structural language in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Vieth, 67 as well as a footnoted statement in Justice Souter's dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Ginsburg) noting that the Justice is "intrigued" by the political markets approach to resolving election law disputes, and might eventually consider constitutional challenges to bipartisan gerrymanders.
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The structuralists are forthright that bipartisan gerrymandering-where legislators create safe districts for both parties, often proportional to their strength in the legislature-imposes no particular harm on any identifiable group of voters. Professor Gerken calls the claim against bipartisan gerrymandering a "diffuse structural harm": "Such an injury implicates an interest shared equally by all voters, such as a desire for healthy democratic competition or an interest in the values the state privileges in drawing district lines."
69 Similarly, Professor Pildes notes:
Bipartisan gerrymandering is emerging as a new, equally serious but different kind of threat to American democracy. . . . Unlike partisan gerrymandering, bipartisan gerrymandering does not represent a problem of skewed representation; [if Democratic registrants and voters are 60% of a state,] 60% of the seats will be controlled by Democratically-dominated election districts. The concern about bipartisan gerrymandering is that it achieves representational parity and the cost of eliminating competitive elections.
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In Chapter Five of my book, I detail a number of arguments against judicial intervention to prevent bipartisan gerrymandering including: (1) there is no strong evidence that gerrymandering, rather than other factors, is primarily responsible for the great incumbency advantage (consider, for example, the incumbency advantage enjoyed by governors, who are elected statewide); (2) it is not clear why "political competition" should be the prime normative criterion under which the Court should craft its election rules; (3) it is not clear that bipartisan gerrymanders lead to a lack of meaningful political competition-there is more than ample political competition within state legislatures and Congress, which many view as more polarized than ever; (4) there is a danger in a court imposing a "one size fits all" solution for a perceived political problem, which prevents state experimentation and different political arrangements that may work well in particular jurisdictions. 71 Structuralist scholarship continues to frustrate me because, among other reasons, it spends so little time justifying Court intervention to "cure" the "problem" of bipartisan gerrymanders. But the scholarship has improved on its consideration of the question of remedy. Professor Pildes, for example, notes that "the remedial problem is genuinely difficult." 72 Or take another example of lack of legislative self-control. In Illinois, if the state legislature cannot agree on a legislative districting plan, redistricting is referred to a commission containing four Democrats and four Republicans. 83 In the event a majority of the commission cannot agree on a plan, a lottery is held, and one member of the commission is given a tie-breaking vote. 84 One might expect that this procedure would be an external constraint to induce compromise. In fact, compromise does not result: in each of the last three decades, there has been a lottery-not to mention litigation over the system itself.
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Still Professor Pildes's proposed remedial solution is indeed a step in the right direction. Modesty on the part of structuralists, like modesty on the Court, is commendable indeed. On this point, I am sure I would find Professor Fuentes-Rohwer heartily agreeing.
V. CHARLES ON CORE AND CONTESTED EQUALITY RIGHTS: WHAT ROLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT IN ELECTION LAW CASES?
Professor Nagle does not say too much about my normative approach, beyond noting that there may be clashes among my three core principles of political equality.
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I readily concede the point, and these are the kinds of cases, as I recognize in the book, 87 that are the most difficult and require a careful balancing of rights and interests.
Professor Fuentes-Rohwer similarly focuses on other issues. But it is here that Professor Charles puts his energies, and it is to this issue I now turn. As a matter of personal political preference, I would very much favor an end to felon disenfranchisement (even for those currently incarcerated) as well as adoption of Professor Raskin's amendment (although I am more ambivalent about moves toward proportional representation). But the question is where such decisions should be made, in the courts or through the political process? Once the door is opened for judicial intervention, it cannot be closed. And liberal judicial activism begets conservative activism in another era. So the Warren Court begets the Rehnquist Court.
The alternative to judicial intervention is not stagnation; it is the court allowing the political process to work as it should. As Professor Karlan has detailed, a number of states are repealing or limiting their felon disenfranchisement laws. 99 Professor Charles minimizes the values of policing outliers; to those poor voters in Virginia who suffered with a state poll tax as late as 1965, I am certain Court intervention was welcome. Professor Charles also ignores the other important, yet less frequently used, role for the Court, namely, to protect the few basic rights essential to a democracy that exist beyond social consensus. To use the example I give in the book, "Imagine what I hope is a very unlikely scenario: in the ongoing 'war on terrorism,' public opinion shifts in a dramatic and antidemocratic fashion so that jurisdictions started passing popular laws denying the right to vote to Arab-Americans." 105 I
conclude that the Court "should unequivocally strike such laws down, regardless of popular opinion and regardless of the consequences for the justices on the Court." 106 This is the answer to Charles's question about why the Court should have protected African-American voting rights despite white Southern opposition during reconstruction.
In addition to these two crucial roles (policing outliers and protecting the deep core of equality rights), the Court is to play another crucial role: it must engage in careful balancing to determine when it is appropriate to defer to legislative decisions to enact certain political equality measures that clash with individual rights. 107 Still, the role for the Supreme Court in election cases would be comparatively minimal: no policing of partisan (much less bipartisan) gerrymanders, no "discovered" constitutional right to proportional interest representation for certain groups, no judicial elimination of felon disenfranchisement through interpretation of the United States Constitution.
A more minimal role for the Supreme Court might be bad for election law as its own field of study (though students would appreciate a casebook under 1,000 pages! 108 ). But it would be good for the United States and the health of its democracy.
